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Abstract of
THE U.S. MERCHANT FLEET--PATTERNS FOR THE SEVENTIES
An analysis of recent U.S. maritime legislation in order to
predict the possible effect it may have on our merchant fleet
growth patterns for the seventies. Major attention is de-
voted to the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 which the Administra-
tion and Congress hopes will halt the continuing decline of
the U.S. merchant fleet. The investigation is limited to
the shipbuilding industry and is concerned primarily with
government incentives, prOVided to both shipbuilders and
shipowners, designed to stimulate new bUilding programs.
This study finds that the U.S. merchant fleet will experi-
ence a healthy growth during this decade as a result of new
maritime legislation. The prospective fleet will depend
heavily upon standardized ship designs and will contain an
ever increasing percentage of large containerized carriers.
The study concludes that the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
will be a giant step toward restoring the nation to the ranks
of a first-rate maritime power. Recommendations to help pro-
mote more shipbUilding and to prOVide expanded markets in-
clude extending construction subsidies to certain ships that
may not initially operate in U.S. ports and creation of a
national marketing program aimed at increasing the U.S.-
flag share of foreign trade.
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THE U.S. ~lliRCHANT FLEET--PATTERNS FOR THE SEVENTIES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background. The story of the gradual decline of the
United St a t e s merchant fleet has been told and retold. Yet,
the fleet continues to shrink. The United States has dropped
from a total of 3,696 merchant ships at the close of World
War II to around 900 s h i p s in our privately owned merchant
fleet. Of the 650 ships involved in foreign trade, some
400 were built during World War II and will probably not
be operating after 1974. 1 Ships flying the American flag
are currently carrying only about s i x percent of U. S. cargo
moving in foreign trade, down from eleven percent a decade
ago.
History has shown that no nation has achieved greatness
nor maintained it without also being a major maritime power.
Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University
and a recognized authority on maritime matters stated back
in 1934:
• • • History is • • • eloquent in demonstrating
that any nation which takes the easy way of per-
mitting its commerce to be carried by foreign
flag ships--which rents the service and space it
is too lazy or too short sighted to provide--is
embarked on a policy of dependency that has ended
every time with the nation in question becoming
a second-rate power. 2
1
The Problem. Recently, the Administration and Congress
have examined and initiated new action in an attempt to halt
the continuing decline of the U.S. merchant marine. The pur-
pose of this study is to conduct an in-depth investigation
of recent U.S. maritime legislation in order to predict the
possible effect it may have on our merchant fleet growth
patterns for the seventies. Specifically, this legislation
consists of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 (PL 91-469) en-
acted on 21 October 1970.
The magnitude of problems in the maritime industry to-
day precludes a thorough study of all phases in this paper.
Accordingly, this investigation will be made from the stand-
point of the shipbuilding industry and will be concerned
primarily with government incentives, provided to both ship-
builders and shipowners, designed to stimulate new building
programs. Trade policies, labor relations, flags of con-
venience, military sealift and domestic politics represent
some areas that cannot be considered although they have a
direct bearing on the future of the industry.
Organization of the Study. In the belief that a knowl-
edge of the past is necessary to an understanding of the
future, Chapter II traces the evolution of past policy and
legislation from the colonial period to the present.
Chapter III examines, in depth, President Nixon's new
maritime program as embodied in the Merchant Marine Act of
1970. 2
:Chapter IV describes the prospective fleet of the
seventies and reviews recent developments in the shipbuild-
ing industry.
Chapter V contains conclusions and recommendations.
3
CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF PAST POLICY AND LEGISLATION
Early Hi story. From the beginning merchant ships have
played an important part in the history of this country.
The American coloni sts were skillful sailors~ shipbuilders~
and shrewd traders. They invented new types of ship s ~ the
schooner and the clipper~ faster and more beautiful than any
1
sailing ship known before.
New England was ill s u i t e d for agriculture~ and the sea
and trade became the national pursuit of the Colonies. The
Yankees prospered~ and the Colonies grew under the protec-
tion of seventeenth century English navigation laws. Prior
to the American Revolution~ colonial trade with the British
West Indies alone amounted to $18 million a year. 2 This
prosperity began to contribute to growing rivalry with the
British. However~ over 30 oppressive British laws and acts
in a 120 year period failed to restrain the aggres sive and
prosperous growth of American s h i Pp i ng . 3 The s h i pbu i l di ng
industry had flouri shed to the point that at the outbreak
of the Revolutionary War over one-third of the s h i ps in the
Briti sh Merchant Fleet had been constructed in colonial ship-
4yards.
The merchant ships of the Colonies~ hastily fitted as
privateers~were an active factor in the s t rug g l e for
4
independence. Though Americans of the colonial period won
success as shipbuilders and seamen, the effect of the Revo-
lution was such that our 900 ships were lost and most of
our overseas carrying trade fell into the hands of British
5
shipowners. Thus the American merchant fleet had almost
disappeared.
At the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783, the Colonies
still had the shipbuilding capability and the raw materials
for ship construction. Prompted by freedom from any restric-
tions of foreign trade, they began rebuilding the maritime
industry. The initial act of the first Congress under the
new Constitution contained a clause allowing a discount of
10% of the tariff duties on all goods imported in ships
6
built and owned by American citizens. Other acts, passed
by this same Congress, placed highly discriminating customs
and tonnage duties on foreign flag cargoes from the East and
served to bar alien carriers from American domestic naviga-
tion. This legislation helped create an era that saw the
imports and exports carried in American ships rise from 23%
7
in 1789 to 90% by 1795.
The years between 1800 and 1840 have been referred to
8
as lithe most glorious period in American maritime history. II
Congress passed no fewer than fifty tariff or other laws
intended to protect American shipbuilding and shipowning.
American shipping responded to the government encouragement
5
by building a merchant fleet that almost equalled the British
in size and far excelled them in performance.
The "most glorious period tl continued until 1840 when
the commercial shipping boom came to an end. One of the
contributing factors to the decline was the advent of the
steamship. American shipowners chose~ however~ to ignore
the potential of steamships~ although the S.S. Savannah had
made a successful crossing of the Atlantic in 1819.
Decline of the Merchant Fleet: 1840-1916. Inevitably~
sail was gradually replaced by iron-hulled steamships~ and
the American merchant marine slipped into a decline from
which it has never completely recovered except for brief
wartime periods. 9 America initially lost her lead~ for she
lacked the abundant coal close to the sea and the skilled
iron workers which Great Britain had. Furthermore~ the time
and money of explorers and investors were being spent in
building railroads and opening up the west. 10
The Civil War seriously damaged the already ailing ship-
ping assets and many vessels were lost or sold abroad. Over
one half of the American ocean fleet was lost in Civil War
action. Postwar high prices and taxes hampered efforts toward
revival~ and England took the lead in bUilding iron and steel
hulled vessels powered by steam and using the more efficient
screw propeller in place of paddlewheels. l l
6
The government attempted to help merchant shipping by
granting contracts for carrying mail or by permitting the
import of shipbuilding materials 1!Vithout tariffs. Neverthe-
less, at the end of the nineteenth century only one American
trans-Atlantic shipping line was in operation. 12
In the "most glorious period" the U. S. merchant marine
had carried as high as 90% of the country's foreign trade,
but the percentage just prior to World War I had dropped to
a meager eight percent. This situation became even more
serious as the ships of warring nations were withdrawn from
our service s and the United States was left with goods piled
up at ports. The resultant catastrophy to American industry
and commerce incited Congress to take remedial action.
Sh i pp i n g Act of 1916. The Sh i pp i ng Act of 1916 permitted
the government to buy, bUild, lease and operate merchant
s h i p s . A new government agency, the U. S . Sh i pp i n g Board,
was given the authority to set up a corporation to build
ships. The Emergency Fleet Corporation built 2,318 ships in
341 emergency shipyards during the period of 1918 to 1922,
but most of them were delivered after the war wa s over. 13
Despite crash programs in sh i p construction, the bulk of
American troops and equipment was transported overseas in
foreign bottoms. In Sep t emb e r 1918, the British alone car-
14
ried over one million tons of American supplies.
7
Merchant Marine Acts of 1920-1928. The new merchant
fleet had been designed hurriedly under emergency conditions~
and many of the ships were not suited to peacetime use. 15
In 1920~ a new Shipping Act was passed which permitted gov-
ernment operation in peacetime of this war-built fleet. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1928 provided for the sale of this
fleet to commercial interests. In an effort to thwart
rigorous foreign competition and high operating costs~ the
Act of 1928 also liberalized. and increased the construction
loan provisions and provided thinly veiled subsidies in the
form of mail contracts. The Merchant Marine Acts of 1920
and 1928 provided some stimulus to cure the ills of the
maritime industry; however~ due primarily to construction
costs~ higher wages and fierce competition~ the U.S. merchant
fleet fell back again to a dangerously low level.
Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 set up a United States Maritime Commission of five
members and laid out a long-range program of shipbuilding
designed to build 500 new ships in the next ten years. It
further provided for government construction and operating
16
subsidies to shipping lines. These subsidies were de-
signed to equal the difference between the cost of building
and operating ships under the American flag.
8
This important Act, sometimes called the "Magna Carta"
of the merchant marine, defined the national policy of the
United St a t e s with regard to the merchant marine in Se c t i on
101 of the Act:
It is necessary for the national defense and de-
velopment of it s foreign and domestic commerce
that the United St a t e s shall have a merchant
marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-
borne commerce and a s u b s t a n t i a l portion of the
water-borne export and import foreign commerce
of the United States and to provide s h i pp i n g ser-
vice on all routes essential for maintaining the
flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne
commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a
naval and military auxiliary in time of war or
national emergency, (c) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United
States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)
composed of the best equipped, safest, and most
s u i t a b l e types of vessels, constructed in the
United St a t es and manned with a trained and ef-
ficient citi zen personnel. It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United St a t e s to foster
the development and encourage the maintenance of
such a merchant marine. 17
World War II. It was most fortunate that prior to the
outbreak of World War II the foundation had been laid for a
gigantic s h i p bu i l d i ng program. Even before the program wa s
well underway, war broke out in Europe and once again a
tremendous demand for shipping arose. With the aid of ex-
perienced. shipyard. management and employees, new sh i py a r ds
were built and thousands of new workers were trained. By ·
concentrating on a simple standard type of vessel, the Liberty
ship, the yards were able to u s e mass production methods of
9
b '1· 18Ul dlng. The bUilding time to complete a new mass pro-
duced Liberty sh i p reached the unbelievable low of forty
days. From 1942 to 1945, some 5,592 merchant s h i p s were built
of which 2,701 were Liberty ships, 414 were the faster Victory
type, 651 were tankers, 417 were standard cargo ships and
the remaining 1,409 were military or minor types. 19 One of
the final blows to the Nazi submarine menace was when the
United St a t e s started producing these ships faster than they
could be s u nk .
In February 1942, the War Sh i pp i n g Admini stration was
e stabli shed and took over the direction of all ship opera-
tions. Included in this group were ships taken over from
private operators in both domestic and foreign trade s.
The se ships, coupled with over 5,000 new merchant type
vessels turned out in s l i gh t l y over four years, carried four-
fifths of the supplies for the entire war effort. 20
Merchant Sh i p Sales Act of 1946. The end of the war
left the United States with an overabundance of ship s and
shipbuilding facilities. Consequently, the government
s ou gh t to restore the merchant fleet to private control as
quickly as possible and also arrange for the sale of the ex-
ces s war-built ships. The Merchant Sh i p Sa l e s Act of 1946
directed the Maritime Commission to dispose o f the surplus
fleet in a manner that would benefit the U. S. merchant marine.
10
This act also provided for charter of vessels by U.S. citi-
zens, placement of ships into the lIReserve Fleet ll and firm
pricing policies on the sale of vessels. American shipowners
purchased about 1,300 ships, about 2,000 were placed in the
reserve fleet and the remainder were sold to foreign inter-
21
ests.
The Korean War. With the outbreak of the Korean War
the United states once again found the degree of readiness
in the merchant fleet at an unacceptable level. In early
1950, President Truman's Reorganization Plan 21 abolished
the independent Maritime Commission and shifted its respon-
sibility to a five-member Federal Maritime Board and a Mari-
22
time Administration within the Department of Commerce.
These new organizations were charged with the same respon-
sibilities contained in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Unfortunately, the Korean War broke out before these new
agencies had organized to cope with the emergency measures
needed to meet sudden heavy demand for shipping.
Since the old War Shipping Board had been dissolved in
1946, Congress hastily created the National Shipping Author-
ity under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Administration to
assume control of all shipping fUnctions in support of the
Korean War. In June 1950, the commercial fleet numbered
1,251 ships totalling 9.3 million gross tons. By the end
11
of 1951, the merchant fleet had expanded to 1,955 ships with
an aggregate 15.3 million tons.
23
This buildup was possible
due to the withdrawal of over 500 ships from the World War
II reserve fleet that had not yet become obsolete.
Decline in the Fifties. Except for the construction of
some 35 fast new "Mariner" type cargo vessels, the Korean
War did not spur much new shipbuilding activity. Conse-
quently, the situation in U.S. shipyards had reached a
desperate state in 1954, when not a single new oceangoing
dry cargo ship had been ordered for more than one and a
24
half years. Operating costs, foreign competition and dis-
interest on the part of the American people all contributed
to the decline. Air, rail, and truck transportation, which
greatly expanded during the previous war, offered reduced
rates and diminished the requirements for ocean shipping. 25
The government again, in the midfifties, recognized the
need to stimulate the maritime industry. Under President
Eisenhower's direction in 1955, government assistance was
given through subsidies to ships operating in the foreign
trade of the United states. Additional incentives provided
government insurance on loans obtained from private companies
to aid in vessel construction. An arrangement was also
agreed upon whereby the government would accept old tanker s
for trade-in credit on the construction of new ships. The
12
program eventually provided for the construction of 179 new
ships as replacements for 293 aging vessels at a government
26
subsidy cost of $1.3 billion.
Numerous attempts have been made to analyze the rather
lethargic state of shipbuilding in the fifties. The answer
seems to be that the American operators were still depending
upon the World War II built ships that had been purchased at
modest prices after the end of the war. While this did in
fact modernize the fleet at that point in time, it also pre-
eluded the building of even newer and more advanced ships
27
such as were on the ways of many foreign nations. Thus,
the post-Korean War decline was destined to continue into
the sixties.
The Vietnam War. In the midsixties the United States
was again faced with a challenge to transport men and sup-
plies to a war zone, this time over an 8,000 mile sea route
to Vietnam. Once again, for the fourth time in this century,
the U.S. merchant marine was unprepared. Excluding the
Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) ships, the total
U.S. flag privately owned ships consisted of 970 ships, in-
28
eluding 549 dry cargo, 262 tankers, and 141 other types.
Almost half of these ships were pushing 20 years of age.
For the first time the World War II reserve fleet, which
still consisted of some 1,300 ships, was not quick to respond.
13
Approximately 800 of the reserve ships were awaiting scrapping
and the remainder were considered to be too obsolete to be
of use. Eventually, approximately 170 ships were withdrawn
from the reserve fleet, repaired, and assigned to private
. 29
shipping companles.
In a lecture delivered to the students of the Naval
War College on 9 December 1971, General Gilbert L. Curtis,
Chief of Staff, Military Airlift Command, estimated that
over 95% of all supplies sent to Vietnam have gone by sea-
30
lift. Due to the limited U.S. merchant marine assets,
over one-third of these goods had to be chartered out to
foreign flag vessels.
Present Status--1970. Unlike previous wars, the Vietnam
conflict failed to provide the United States with the inc en-
tive to build a new merchant fleet. Helen D. Bentley, Chair-
man of the Federal Maritime Commission, summed up the alarming
facts in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College on
12 May 1970:
Over two thirds of our privately owned merchant
ships are pushing 25 years of age, or over. More
than 600 of the 975 privately owned ships under
our flag are heading strai~ht for the shipwreckers.
• . • Of our better than $70 billion in export-
import trade more than $40 billion of ·which is
oceanborne--we carry a bare six percent in ships
of our own flag. 31
Can this trend be reversed? The Merchant Marine Act of
1970, discussed in depth in the next chapter, is the latest
14
attempt by the Administration and Congress to salvage a
floundering industry (see Appendix, Figures 1, 2).
Summa r y . This chapter, through a review of past major
policies and legislation, has traced the evolution of the
U.S. merchant marine from its colonial beginnings to the
present in the belief that a knowledge of the past is es-
sential to an understanding of future legislation and trends.
Si n c e its birth, the United States has depended upon a
healthy merchant fleet; however, as pointed out this fleet
has often had to resort to "crashlf shipbuilding and ac-
quisition programs to meet the challenge.
From the "most glorious period lf in 1840, the U.S. mer-
chant marine declined steadily. This decline continued un-
til the outbreak of World War I when emergency measures
were taken to allow the government to buy and build new
ships. Unfortunately, hundreds of these ships arrived too
late to be of u se in the war. Decline again set in after
World War I and became the rule until World War II provided
the incentive to build another strong fleet. These ship s,
built in the forties, are still the backbone of our fleet
today. Si n c e World War II other seafaring nations have made
tremendous advances in modernizing their merchant fleets,
while the U.S. fleet has dwindled to a few hundred s h i p s .
15
In an effort to smooth out the ebb and flow of ship-
bUilding the government has enacted into the law the Merchant
Marine Acts (1916, 1920, 1928, 1936). The continued peace-
time decline of today's fleet indicates that new action is
needed to rebuild a strong and effective merchant marine.
16
CHAPTER III
THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1970
Introduction.
The Maritime Industry of the United States
has been permitted to decline to a point at which
the nation's defense and economic welfare are
imperiled. • • • We must set as our goal a sharp
increase of the transport of U.S. trade aboard
American flagships. The present rate is 5.6 per-
cent; by the mid-seventies, we must see that rate
over 30 percent and the growth accelerating•••.
I support a building program to accomplish that
objective. l
--Richard M. Nixon - 1968
Merchant ships are indispensable to the economy of a
powerful trading nation like the United States, not only in
war but also in peacetime. The increased complexity of to-
day's world, both militarily and economically, precludes
the United States from ever again relying upon wartime build-
ups to revitalize the merchant marine.
Militarily, as the strongest power in the non-Communist
world, the United States has major responsibilities and far-
flung interests. This country now has treaty relationships
w.i th, or commitments to the defense of, some 44 countries
throughout the world. The strategic mobility concept and
the Nixon Doctrine depend heavily upon this nation's ability
to project instantly U.S. forces and materials to any part
of the globe. Except for the initial contingency, which may
17
be transported by airlift, the U.S. merchant marine will
have to be ready to carry up to 95 percent of the men and
war materials. Compounding this problem is the fact that
the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF),which has helped
the United States buy time in the past, will have disappeared
as a source of au9mentation in 1978.
Economically U.S.-flag merchant shipping contributes
significantly to the balance of payments and is an important
employer~ taxpayer and customer of U. S. goods. In this
period of balance of trade deficits~ a strong merchant
marine takes on even added importance. The U. S. Commerce
Commission has predicted that by 1980 U. S. exports and im-
ports will reach $90 billion. This growth in foreign trade
will require a parallel growth in U. S. shipping capacity to
ensure efficient shipment of these goods at reasonable cost.
In early 1969 President Nixon forwarded to the Congress
a new legislative program calling for the construction of
300 new cargo ships suitable for carrying an increased por-
tion of the U.S. export-import trade. The President's plan
was coupled to a new subsidy program and a substantially
increased research and. development program. 2 The important
features of the new Presidential program were defined in the
text of the Nixon Merchant Fleet Message to Congress on 23
October 1969.
18
The Shipbuilding Industry. The new shipbuilding pro-
gram is designed to make it possible for shipbuilders to
build more ships while encouraging them to hold down the
cost of each vessel. Implicit in this program is a sub-
stantially improved system of construction differential sub-
sidies. These subsidies will allow our shipbuilders to sell
their ships at world market prices for use in U.S. foreign
trade. The important features of the new subsidy system~
all of which have subsequently been incorporated into the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970~ are as follows:
1. Industry will be able to build more ships over the
next ten years, moving from the present subsidy level of
about 10 ships a year to a new level of 30 ships a year.
2. The percentages of total costs which are subsidized
will be reduced. The present 55% of a builder's total ex-
penses for a given vessel will be reduced to 45% in fiscal
year 1971. That percentage should be reduced by two per-
cent in each subsequent year until the maximum subsidy pay-
ment is down to 35% of total building expenses.
3. Construction differential subsidies will be paid
directly to shipbuilders rather than being channeled through
shipowners as is the case under the present system. A direct
payment system is provided to encourage builders to improve
designs, reduce delays and minimize costs.
19
4. The multiyear procurement system which is now used
for other government programs will be extended to shipbuild-
ing. Under this system the government makes a firm commit-
ment to build a given number of ships over a specified and
longer period of time, a practice which will allow the in-
dustry to realize important economies of scale and to re-
ceive lower subsidies.
5. The increased level of ship construction will re-
quire a corresponding increase in the level of federally
insured mortgages. Accordingly, the ceiling on our present
mortgage insurance program will be raised from $1 billion
to $3 billion.
6. Construction differential subsidies will be extended
to bulk carriers, ships which usually carry ore, grain, or
oil and which are not covered by our present subsidy program.
7. A commission will be established to review the
status of the American shipbuilding industry, its problems
and its progress toward meeting the challenge set forth.
The commission will report its findings within three years
and recommend any changes in government policy it considers
desirable.
The President concluded his message with the following
statement: lilt is my hope and expectation that this program
will introduce a new era in the maritime history of America,
an era in which our shipbuilding and ship operating
20
industries take their place once again among the rigorous,
competitive industries of this nation.,,3
Review of the Program. Legislation to implement the
program went to Congress in December 1969. Few changes were
sought in the legislature and even those who suggested
changes gave strong support to the legislation in their
testimony. Significant support came from shipbuilders and
their suppliers, shipowners, ship operators and the Maritime
Trade Unions. Prominent among this group was the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping whose members control over
six million deadweight tons of commercially owned shipping
under the U.S.-flag. The U.S. Navy strongly endorsed the
new shipbuilding program since it must depend heavily upon
the U.S. merchant fleet to transport war materials and men.
The bill in its final form was reported out of the special
House-Senate Conference Committee on 30 September 1970 and
was signed into law by President Nixon as the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 on 21 October 1970.
This new Merchant Marine Act has largely superseded the
controversial and largely ineffective Merchant Marine Act of
1936. That Act, forged in the years of depression, provided
government help to only a few select individuals and corpora-
tions. The new act opens wide the doors of opportunity to
all Americans who think they could be successful in the ocean
21
shipping business, and who are willing to risk capital to do
4
so.
In it s key provi sion, the bill underwrite s the construc-
tion of s ome 300 new cargo ships for the U. S. merchant fleet
over the next ten years. The government's share of the cost
of these s h i ps will probably amou n t to a figure in exce s s of
$3 billion f o r construction-differential s u bS i dy .5 It
should be pointed out here that thi s provision is already
headed for trouble a nd thu s will be sp e c ifi c a l l y a ddre s s ed
in the n ext chapter along with a prediction as to the
sp e c i f i c mix of these 300 s h i ps .
Under the n ew program the construction-differential
payment s by the g ov e r nmen t are s c h e du l e d to be reduced from
55% of ves sel construction cost s to 45% in fi scal year 1971,
then two percent l es s each y ear s o that by 1976 the total
allowable s u bs idy will be 35% o f construction costs. Recent
s t u di e s on construction and techniques have indicat ed that
thi s i s fea sible i f large orders for sh i ps a re forthcoming.
Pr odu c t i on of s tanda rdi z ed ship s s h ou l d also h elp achieve
thi s g oa l . Pre sident Nixon ha s stated, that if thi s chal-
l enge cannot be met, a Pres i den t i a l committe e will exami n e
the fact s a n d mak e recommendations r elative to the future
6
of the program.
One of the most s ign i f i can t a c t i ons of the n ew l aw i s
the way in which the gov e r nme n t 1s construction sub sidy will
22
be awarded. Unlike the 1936 Act, where only the berth lines
could apply for subsidy, any shipyard in the United States
or any citizen ship purchaser may make application for con-
struction-differential subsidy. Whether the yard of the
purchaser is the applicant the subsidy is to be paid di-
rectly to the shipyard for the construction or conversion
of vessels for foreign trade. 7 It is believed that direct
subsidy to the yards will give them more incentive to bring
costs down and. promote their own designs for ships.
The mUltiyear contracting method, now practiced by the
Navy, is designed to issue firm commitments to shipyards.
This enables them to have a backlog of orders and plot
future work loads. Because of these mass production methods
the government gains the benefit of lower unit prices per
8
ships. This should provide the incentives for shipbuilders
to plan ahead and make the additional capital investment
necessary to upgrade and modernize the shipyards.
Another aid to operators in obtaining new ships has
been the Ship Mortgage Insurance which provides an induce-
ment for private investment capital to channel monies into
ship mortgages at lower interest rates. 9 The government
will guarantee both principal and interest on ship mortgages.
The anticipated increased construction level will necessi-
tate raising the ceiling on the present federal mortgage
program to $3 billion.
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An important incentive not previously discussed should
be injected here, for it provides the greatest inducement
for building new tonnage in U.S. yards. The new law ex-
tends tax deferments on construction funds to previously
nonsubsidized operators, including vessel operators on the
Great Lakes and those that serve the noncontiguous trade
routes to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Guam. Towboat,
barge and fishing vessel operators are included among those
eligible to make use of these funds. Earnings of a shipping
company can be placed in escrow for new ship construction
before income taxes. That income, if plowed back into the
account, will be tax free. l O
The funds necessary to support these various programs,
including all subsidy payments, are appropriated each year
by Congress under the authority of Section 209 of the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936. Individual funding arrangements
and subsidy payments are controlled and monitored by the U.S.
Maritime Administration (MARAD). The first year appropria-
tions for fiscal year 1971 amounted to $485.8 million. In
August 1971, President Nixon signed legislation authorizing
a record $507.6 million for the second year's expenditures.
The bulk of this appropriation is earmarked for construction
and operating subsidies while over $25 million will be used
11for research and development.
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It is still too early to predict how accessible these
funds will be in the future. It is safe to assume that
there will always be growing competition from other high
priority domestic programs. Additionally, as the new fleet
grows, competition for subsidies and cargo will surely arise
from other modes of transportation such as air and rail.
This problem will be alleviated somewhat due to the projected
growth of intermodal transportation systems where goods
travel door-to-door by way of all transportation modes.
Summary. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 seems to be
extremely practical and tuned to the needs of the 1970
's.
The bipartisan nature of support and the ease in which it
cleared both the Senate and House of Representatives are
indicative of the Congressional concern to replace aging
vessels and reorganize existing shipping regulations and
subsidies. Although this study is primarily concerned with
the shipbuilding industry, it is apparent from the complexity
of the act that the government recognizes that no progress
can be made in rejuvenating the merchant fleet without the
cooperation of the shipbuilders, the shipowners and the mari-
time labor force.
The initial response has been encouraging; howeve~ since
the act is still only 18 months old there are, needless to
say, several unanswered questions. Of paramount concern
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will be the ability of U.S. operators to show they can in-
crease subs t a nt i a l l y their share of U.S. foreign trade to
attract the capital they need to build the new ships.
The next chapter will address growth patterns and pro-
vide a profile of the fleet for the s ev ent i e s based on past
hi story and recent development s s i nc e the pas sage of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
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CHAPTER IV
MERCHANT SHIPS FOR THE SEVENTIES
Introduction. Although the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
is still in its infancy, there has been enough reaction from
the government, shipbuilders and the shipping industry to
project with some degree of accuracy the status of the U.S.
merchant fleet at the end of this decade. Most officials
are optimistic about the future but admit that a halt to the
decline will no longer occur until the midseventies, as the
first ships probably will not appear until late 1973. This
chapter will present the ship designs most likely to be re-
quired during the seventies, the prospective fleet, and an
analysis of recent developments that may tend to alter some-
'wh a t the original concepts of the new shipbuilding program.
The Ships. Si n c e the new program encourages the use of
standard ship designs suitable for mUltiship, multiyear pro-
duction, Maritime Administration officials announced in June
1969, that a research program would be established to deter-
mine the types of ships and the fleet mix that would be re-
quired to carry our foreign trade. From special studies
conducted within MARAD, together with judgments expressed by
commercial trade route analysts, the ship designs most likely
to be required during the seventies have been identified.
Specifically they are:
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1. A single screw container ship capable of carrying
1,500 to 1,700 twenty-foot equivalent containers at 24 knots.
Capabilities should be available on s p e c i f i c trades to carry
some general cargo.
2. A large twin screw container ship capable of carry-
ing approximately 2,000 twenty-foot equivalent s at up to 28
to 30 knots.
3. A general purpose cargo ship of about 15,000 to
20,000 deadweight tons cargo capacity and a speed of 20-24
knots.
4. A utility cargo ship of from 25,000 to 30,000 cargo
deadweight and a speed of 16 knots capable of carrying dry
bulk cargoes in addition to breakbulk. An important cri-
teria for this ship is its cost. It must be inexpensive to
acquire and operate if it is to compete with foreign "Liberty
Ship" replacements.
5. An Ore/Bulk/Oil carrier of 60,000 to 70,000 cargo
deadweight and a speed of about 16 knots. This ship should
be offered in a large range of product options from a special
configuration for single products to a more flexible arrange-
ment such as Ore/Bulk/Oil.
6. A large tanker of approximately 120,000 cargo dead-
weight and a speed of 16 knots suitable also for Ore/Bulk/
Oil option.
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7. A barge carrier, which is a radical departure from
convention and has yet to be fully evaluated, although several
versions are currently in operation. The demand for this
ship is presently uncertain as an industry standard, although
it appears to have definite advantages over container ships
1
and general cargo ships in specific trading situations.
The Prospective Fleet. After d etermining through ini-
tial studies which types of ships would be competitive in
various trade areas carrying the full spectrum of available
commercial cargo, an analysis was required to ascertain the
relative numbers of these ships required within the three
hundred ship program. To achieve this end, one study con-
tract was awarded to Bath Iron Works Company and another con-
tract with an identical mission was awarded to the Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. From these estimates,
Bath and Newport News projected the merchant fleet of 1982.
1982 Projections of the U.S. Merchant Fleet
Ship Type Newport News Estimate Bath Estimate
1. Container 22 65
2. General Cargo 173 15
3. Utility Cargo 90
4. Ore/Bulk/Oil 83 80
5. Tanker 22 25
6. Barge Carrier
---2
TOTAL 300 300
Source: J.A. Higgins and J.J. Garvey, "Merchant Fleets
for the Seventies, " Naval Engineers Journal, Decemb er 1970,
p. 36. 29
According to a study released by Harbridge House, Inc.,
of Boston, a nationally known management consulting and re-
search firm, foreign flag domination of the U.S. trades will
soon be a thing of the past because of U.S.-developed con-
tainer-ship and barge-carrying systems. Although it is per-
haps overly optimistic, the study concluded that the Ameri-
can merchant marine of the future has the potential to be-
come the world leader in developing a fast, door to door,
2international transportation system. This emphasis on the
new high-technology ships seems to indicate that the Bath
Iron Works! estimate may be more realistic since it contains
a higher number of both container and barge carrier ships.
By 1976 the study estimates that the United States will have
a modern 424-ship fleet. 3 More conservative estimates pre-
diet a modern fleet of about 500 ships by 1980 with a total
cargo deadweight of 30 million tons as compared with some 15
million tons in 1970. Before this desired situation can be
realized, however, government and industry must develop a
national marketing program aimed at increasing the U.S.-
4flag share of U.S. foreign trade.
Recent Developments. As of 15 January 1971, MARAD had
counted 13 preliminary applications for construction subsidy
funds involving 33 merchant vessels, of which 28 were OBO
carriers, two tankers and three barge ships. Five shipyards
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are a ctively marketing OBO designs approximat ely 78,000 dead-
weight tons each. S Unfortunat ely, contracts for the con-
struction of only 1 2 ships had be en signed by the end of
1971 , far f ewer than the goal of 30 ships p er y e a r. ~ffiRAD
officials now a dmi t t hat the r a te of 30 ships a y ear for the
next t en years was too much to expe c t , particularly in the
shaky ec on omy of the past y ear. Assistant Comme r c e Secre-
tary Andrew E . Gibson c ommented in a r e c ent int ervi ew: "We
had a ll hoped to be further down the track than we are at
the moment. But I b elieve most of the start-up problems
6
hav e b e en resolv ed and are b ehind us."
MARAD no longer t alks in t erms of build i ng 30 s hips a
year but rather "the e qu i valen t of" 30 ships a year sinc e
many op erators now want larger ships that c a r r y heavier
c a rg oe s an d make a l arger profit. Cons e quently, the old
siz e l i mi t s ( 8 0, 000 d e adweight tons ) sugg est ed in the
original studies have already been scrapp ed by t h e Gove r n -
ment. The new emp h a s i s will b e on larger tankers and c a rgo
c ont a i ne r ships with g r e a te r capac i t y r a ther than on numb ers
of ships. This fact c oup led with the numb er of c on s t r uc t i on
contrac ts let to dat e will undoub t edly mean t hat the 300
ship g oal will h ave to be r evis ed downward to about 200 n ew
ships by 19 80. Usin g the Bat h est i ma te a s a gu i d e and sp eak-
ing in t erms of e quivalent ships, the total d eadweight ton-
nag e for the n ew 200 ships will not c hange signific antly
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from the 15 million tons originally planned if 300 ships
were to be build.
The Government is also reconsidering its ban on sub-
sidized ships picking up foreign cargo in one port abroad
and delivering it to another location abroad. Currently
such ships must travel back and forth between U.S. and over-
seas ports. 7 The idea here is to promote construction of
250,000 ton tankers and allow such ships to handle strictly
foreign shipments until U.S. ports are ready to take them.
At present they cannot enter any ports on the East Coast and
only a few on the West Coast.
The most encouraging new shipbuilding development to
date was the announcement in February 1972 that the largest
commercial shipbuilding order ever placed with an American
facility had been approved by MARAD. The package submitted
by Maritime Dynamics, Inc., a newly formed corporation, pro-
vides for the construction of six giant supertankers at
General Dynamics l Quincy Shipyard at a reported cost of over
8
$350 million. These new ships, when constructed, will be
used in U.S. foreign trade.
Summary. Recent developments have pointed out that
the initial studies done by MARAD on standard ship designs
will have to be slightly revised. Specifically the new em-
phasis is on larger tankers and cargo containers. General
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Dynamics' Quincy Shipyard has already received a contract
to build six supertankers in the 225,000 ton category.
From all indications the fleet mix presented by Bath
Iron Works for 1982 seems to be holding true. The number
of container ships required during the next ten years is
still uncertain with an estimated range from 22 to 65 ships.
The conditions upon which the final number depends will be
determined by the continued development of container ser-
vices on all international trade routes to the extent it has
developed on the North Atlantic. 9
Finally, since MARAD now talks in terms of building
"the equivalent of" 30 ships a year, it is apparent that
the initial estimates made by Harbridge House, Inc., and
others will have to be revised downward by about 100 ships
for 1980. The amount of this nationfs foreign trade carried
in U.S. ships should rise, however, since the new fleet will
consist of large, fast, highly mechanized ships. Unfor-
tunately, due to the program's slow start, the Administra-
tion1s goal of increasing this share to 30% by the mid-
seventies is no longer obtainable. From all indications it
is still within the realm of reality that this goal can be
attained by 1980. The U.S. merchant fleet may finally be
on the road to recovery.
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C~P~RV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions. This study has traced the history and
evolution of past U.S. merchant marine legislation and policy
from its earliest Colonial beginnings to the present. The
U.S. merchant marine has always served its nation well,
even in the face of its own physical deterioration and the
growing commercial competition from foreign lines.
United States maritime policy in the past has been in-
fluenced by reactions to specific threats to the national
security. Consequently, the United States has not been able
to maintain a strong peacetime fleet. Only the impetus of
war has encouraged significant changes in maritime policy
and renewed shipbuilding activity. Crash construction of
merchant ships in wartime can be avoided only by maintaining
a posture of strength in peacetime.
United States maritime policy and legislation have not
produced the results envisioned in the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936. The construction differential subsidies and other
government aid programs have failed to foster, encourage oY
maintain an adequate and internationally competitive mer-
chant marine. Illustrative of this fact has been the con-
tinued decline in the amount of this nation's foreign trade
carried in U.S. flagships.
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The Nixon plan to revitalize the U.S. merchant marine,
resoundingly passed by Congress~ will be a giant step toward
restoring the nation to the ranks of a first-rate maritime
power. This new legislation is a landmark~ not only because
it modernizes the ship subsidy system~ but also because it
expands these benefits to previously nonsubsidized operators.
These and other inducements make the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 the largest package of incentives ever offered to the
maritime industry.
The initial reaction to this new program has been slow
but progressively encouraging. The goal of building 300
new ships by 1980 is no longer a reality, but the new em-
phasis on larger ships will permit the construction of lithe
equivalent of" 300 ships with a total cargo deadweight of
15 million tons. Still unknown~ of course, is the ability
of U.S. operators to show that they can increase their share
of U.S. foreign trade substantially enough to attract the
capital they need to build the new ships.
The prospective fleet will depend heavily upon stan-
dardized ship designs and will contain an ever increasing
percentage of large containerized carriers and bulk tankers
in the 250,000 ton category. The exact numbers vary con-
siderably, but construction should parallel the development
of port facilities tailored to their needs.
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Recommendations. In order to promote more shipbuilding
in American yards and encourage ship operators to seek out
more foreign trade, the Government should reconsider its
ban on subsidized ships picking up foreign cargo in one
port abroad and delivering it to another location abroad.
Lifting this ban would not only promote the construction
of 250~OOO ton and larger ships~ but would also place at
the disposal of the U.S. Government a formidable fleet of
U.S.-flag vessels to be used in event of a national emer-
gency. Although not directly involved in U.S. foreign
trade, these ships will have an important mission of ensur-
ing that our flag not vanish from the harbors around the
globe.
It is further recommended that government and industry
develop a national marketing program aimed at increasing
the U.S.-flag share of foreign trade. The new high-tech-
nology ships will help increase this share~ but a deliberate
coordinated selling program will be needed to guarantee suc-
cess in seeking new markets.
The Government should maintain a flexible posture with
regard to the construction-differential subsidies. The plan
to reduce the maximum subsidy payment to 35% by 1976 should
be abandoned if meeting the lower subsidy goal will make it
impossible for shipbuilders to operate at a profit.
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Finally, although the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 in
its pres ent form has become an impetus to new shipbuilding
activity, it should not be allowed to become inflexible.
The Act should be under constant review by Congress and
MARAD to ensure its success in providing the stimulus so
vital to the maintenance of a viable merchant marine.
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FI GURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U. S. FOREI GN TRADE CARRIED I N AMERICAN FLAG VE SSELS
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FIGURE 3
WORLD MERCHANT FLEET GROWTH
(1000 Gross Tons and Over)
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